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Abstract The paper presents a renewed Habermasian view
on transnational multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and
assesses the institutional characteristics of the Equator
Principles Association (EPA) from a deliberative democ-
racy perspective. Habermas’ work has been widely adopted
in the academic literature on the political responsibilities of
(multinational) corporations (i.e., political corporate social
responsibility), and also in assessing the democratic qual-
ities of MSIs. Commentators, however, have noted that
Habermas’ approach relies very much on ‘nation-state
democracy’ and may not be applicable to democracy in
MSIs—in which nation-states are virtually absent. We
argue that Habermas’ detailed conceptualization of the
institutionalization of deliberative democracy can be
applied to transnational MSIs if these initiatives can be said
to have their own ‘de`moi’ that can be represented in
associational decision-making. Therefore, we develop a
definition of the de`mos of an MSI based on the notion of
collective agency. Subsequently, we explain how Haber-
mas’ approach to democracy can be applied to MSIs and
show that it has more to offer than hitherto has been
uncovered. Our illustrative analysis of the EPA confirms
the criticisms regarding this MSI which have recently been
articulated by researchers and practitioners, but also yields
new findings and possible avenues for the further devel-
opment of the EPA: That is, although our assessment
suggests that the EPA in its current state is still far from
being a democratic MSI, the possibility of a sensible
analysis of its democratic character indicates that transna-
tional MSIs can, in principle, help to fill governance gaps
in a democratic way.
Keywords Equator Principles  Multi-stakeholder
initiatives  Transnational (soft-law) regulation 
Deliberative democracy  Habermas
Introductory Remarks
The Equator Principles (EPs) are a voluntary and self-
regulatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative
in the finance industry. In particular, they are a credit risk
management framework for identifying, preventing,
addressing and mitigating adverse environmental and
social risks and impacts in project finance transactions.
The EP-framework can be considered as a multi-stake-
holder initiative (MSI) since several stakeholders, such as
financial institutions, international organizations and
NGO–watchdogs, have been involved in the drafting and
reviewing process. In addition, multiple stakeholder groups
are also addressed by the principles—for instance, project
developers and operators—and/or are otherwise affected by
their application, e.g., local (indigenous) communities. The
EPs are, furthermore, an example of transnational ‘soft-
law’ regulation. That is, they help to fill ‘institutional
voids’ (i.e., governance gaps and regulatory vacuums)
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in situations where national governments or supra-/inter-
national bodies are not willing or able to effectively reg-
ulate business conduct, especially in terms of
environmental, social and human rights issues. The EPs
thus regulate a field that has often been considered the
exclusive domain of nation-states (Kobrin 2009).
Yet, in contrast to democratically organized nation-
states which in principle articulate the collective will of
their de`moi, the Equator Principles Association (EPA) does
not obtain its legitimacy through the democratic engage-
ment of all those who are submitted to its regulations.
Recent academic research (Lazarus 2014, 2015; Wo¨rsdo¨r-
fer 2014; Hennig and Wo¨rsdo¨rfer 2015) has shown that,
despite various progresses made in the recent past (cp. the
latest version of the EPs with its predecessors), the EPA
still lacks adequate stakeholder engagement rules at the
associational and individual member level. Also, a reform
commission set up by the EPA itself has made proposals
for improving the engagement of stakeholders, such as
NGOs, civil society organizations and project-affected
communities (Lazarus and Feldbaum 2011, 10; BankTrack
2011, 10; 2012). So far, however, no substantial reform
measures have been taken: The so-called Equator banks or
Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) are still
the primary actors with regard to the (further) development
and implementation of the EPs, while arrangements for the
engagement of other stakeholders in EPA-decision-making
continue to be mainly absent. As a consequence, some
commentators (Wo¨rsdo¨rfer 2016) worry that the EPA dis-
plays a ‘democratic deficit’ (Scherer and Palazzo 2011).
Establishing whether an MSI like the EPA actually
suffers from a democratic deficit requires understanding
the democratic potential of such transnational CSR-initia-
tives in general. Yet, in the current business ethics litera-
ture, this topic has received scant attention. It is true that
many authors address the political responsibilities of cor-
porations (Hussain and Moriarty 2016; Ma¨kinen and
Kourula 2012; Ne´ron 2010; Scherer and Palazzo
2007, 2008, 2011; Scherer et al. 2009; Whelan 2012); they
also emphasize that these responsibilities may become
particularly salient when businesses engage in the devel-
opment of MSIs and other forms of (trans-)national regu-
lation (Pies et al. 2013). However, so far only Mena and
Palazzo (2012) and Hahn and Weidtmann (2016) have
started to flesh out democracy for the specific case of MSIs.
Following the seminal work of Scherer and Palazzo
(2007, 2008, 2011), Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann
take Habermas’ approach to deliberative democracy as a
starting point. They propose criteria such as inclusion of
stakeholders, procedural fairness, transparency of pro-
cesses, and output legitimacy for the democratically legit-
imate development of regulations in transnational MSIs
that can, in principle, serve for analyzing the democratic
qualities of the EPA (and other MSIs) (Mena and Palazzo
2012; Hahn and Weidtmann 2016). Thus, Mena/Palazzo
and Hahn/Weidtmann recognize that transnational regula-
tion, by means of a multi-stakeholder network, creates a
specific context for the political responsibilities of corpo-
rations—a context that changes their responsibilities. In
MSIs, corporations share responsibilities with regard to
environmental, social and human rights issues with other
stakeholders, such as NGOs. Corporations are embedded in
a self-regulating network that, as a whole, cares about its
legitimacy with regard to its own members and to com-
munities, organizations and persons that are affected by its
rules. This responsibility is different from the situation in
which a ‘solitary’ corporation fulfils state-like functions
and should be held responsible for regulation with regard to
deliberating citizens.1 The situation created by the intro-
duction of a multi-stakeholder network demands a specific
institutionalization of accountability, which can be inspired
by Habermas’ conception of deliberative democracy, but
also requires a transformation of his work.
Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann do not explain,
however, in which way their approaches follow and/or
transform Habermas’ theory, which was not meant for a
direct application to transnational multi-stakeholder net-
works. Besides, neither Mena and Palazzo (2012) nor Hahn
and Weidtmann (2016) take full advantage of Habermas’
detailed conceptualization of the institutionalization of
deliberative democracy: Habermas (1996) makes clear that
the democratic qualities of law making in modern nation-
states depend on the institutionalization of a constellation
of five differentiated but connected regulative elements: (1)
deliberative preparation in public discussions; (2) repre-
sentative decision-making about regulation; (3) imple-
mentation by an administration; (4) adjudication of
regulation; and (5) explicit meta-regulation of these four
elements in a constitutional framework. These elements
and their interactions are central to a Habermasian
approach to the institutionalization of democracy and
promise a further elaboration of a framework for analyzing
MSIs.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a transformation
of Habermas’ conceptualization of deliberative democracy
to make it available for assessing the democratic qualities
1 This situation of a ‘solitary’ corporation builds the background for
Hussain and Moriarty’s (2016) proposal to remove corporations from
a policy making role in political CSR and to reserve this role for
representatives of civil society. Our paper is different in the sense that
it analyzes the whole network of stakeholders and asks which
characteristics this network should have in order to render it
democratic. Functioning in such a network would require corpora-
tions to facilitate and respect these democratic qualities. Whether they
do so or not is a question we cannot address here since it exceeds the
(primary) scope of the paper.
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of MSIs and subsequently show its usefulness in an anal-
ysis of the EPA’s democratic qualities.
To transform Habermas’ conceptualization and make it
available for the analysis of MSIs, we must pass a hurdle
that was indicated by Ma¨kinen and Kourula (2012) as well
as Whelan (2012). They note that Habermas’ conceptual-
ization relies very much on ‘nation-state democracy’ and is
not directly applicable to MSIs and other transnational
regulators. According to Habermas, the legitimacy of
transnational regulation should be enhanced through the
engagement of nation-states which are able to democrati-
cally represent their de`moi (Habermas 2009). Seen from
this perspective, stakeholders would at best be indirectly
democratically engaged as members of national de`moi: On
Habermas’ account, the democratic qualities of an MSI
would depend on the (level of) democracy in the nation-
states that are engaged (and not on the democratic insti-
tutions of the MSI itself). To take this hurdle, and to
explain how Habermas’ regulative elements of deliberative
democracy can be applied to the direct engagement of
stakeholders in an MSI, we argue that an MSI is a bounded
community with its own de`mos. We develop an approach
for identifying the de`mos of an MSI on the basis of the
notion of collective agency (List and Koenig-Archibugi
2010; List and Pettit 2011): The community of authors/
addressees of MSI-rules can be seen as a collective actor
that constitutes a de`mos. Other stakeholders that are
affected by an MSI but are not addressed by its rules do not
belong to this de`mos. Here, our approach reveals a nar-
rower account of the de`mos than has been presupposed by
Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann. Nevertheless,
Habermas’ general discourse principle (Habermas 1996,
107) requires that these otherwise affected stakeholders
should also be engaged in the discussions of the political
community and considered in decision-making. Taken
together, the elaborations in this paper provide a deliberate
argument for identifying the de`mos of an MSI, a Haber-
masian set of democratic legitimacy criteria for the direct
engagement of the stakeholders that belong to the de`mos,
and a solution for involving the otherwise affected stake-
holders. We thus generate a framework that offers more
versatility in the identification of relevant stakeholders and
their engagement in the MSI, and considerably more
breadth in the analysis of the institutionalization of
democracy than has hitherto been proposed.
Our framework is then applied to assess the democratic
qualities of the EPA: The paper first identifies the stake-
holders that make up the de`mos of the EPA and the
otherwise affected stakeholders that are not included in the
de`mos. Subsequently, it examines whether and how
Habermas’ five elements of deliberative democracy could
be institutionalized in the EPA. Our analysis illustrates that
Habermas’ five regulative elements of deliberative
democracy are not only relevant for nation-states, but can,
in principle, also be instantiated in MSIs. Moreover, the
possibility of this instantiation indicates that such initia-
tives cannot only help to fill governance gaps and regula-
tory vacuums; they can also be democratized and thus help
in overcoming democratic deficits in transnational regula-
tion independent of nation-states.
Our illustrative analysis shows that the EPA is still far
from being a democratic multi-stakeholder CSR-initiative
and yields new findings and possible avenues for the fur-
ther development of the EPA. Our assessment suggests that
transnational MSIs can, in principle, help to fill governance
gaps in a democratic way.
The paper is structured as follows: In the second section,
we develop a Habermasian framework for the assessment
of the democratic qualities of the EPs and similar MSIs
along the lines indicated above. In the third section, we
analyze the EPA by means of this framework and identify
structural reforms pertaining to the further embedding of
democracy in the EPA. In the fourth section, we briefly
summarize the main conclusions and indicate how our
Habermasian conceptualization of democracy contributes
to the academic literature on MSIs.
A Habermasian Account of Deliberative
Democracy in MSIs
Establishing whether a ‘democratic deficit’ (Scherer and
Palazzo 2011) actually exists in the EPA and, more gen-
erally in MSIs, requires a conceptualization of the char-
acteristics that make an MSI democratic. This raises the
question as to which governance structures are necessary to
render an MSI, a democratically legitimate regulator for
the stakeholders submitted to it. We answer this question
from a Habermasian perspective of deliberative
democracy.
Roughly speaking, the ideal of deliberative democracy
entails that all those that are submitted to a set of rules
should also have access to communicative deliberation
about the development of these rules (Benhabib 1996;
Dryzek 2010; Habermas 1996). Deliberative democracy is
largely procedural in nature and imposes a minimum of
normative foundations. Therefore, it is considered helpful
for the political dimension of business in contemporary
society that is characterized by a plurality of conflicting
substantive views about morality and the good life (Scherer
and Palazzo 2007, 2011). Especially, Habermas’ approach
to deliberative democracy is often applied for understand-
ing political demands on business. Scherer and Palazzo
(2007, 2011) mention his approach to democracy—and
particularly his recent pragmatist variant (Habermas 1996;
Scherer and Palazzo 2007)—as a possible orientation for
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the discussion about political responsibilities in domains
where the distinction between public and private spheres is
blurred (Kobrin 2009).
However, Habermas’ work cannot be applied to
transnational MSIs without some modifications. Ma¨kinen
and Kourula (2012) as well as Whelan (2012) note that the
Habermasian approach to deliberative democracy relies to
a considerable degree on the democratic structures of tra-
ditional (Westphalian) nation-states2 (Bohman 2007;
Scheuerman 2008). For Habermas, in the present ‘post-
national constellation’ (Baur 2011, 21ff.; Habermas 2001;
Scherer and Palazzo 2008; Wettstein 2010, 279ff.),
democratic legitimacy can only be reliably obtained
through the democratically organized decision-making
structures of nation-states (Whelan 2012, 726f.). Habermas
(2009) does not see a real alternative to the rather well-
defined peoples that form the ‘de`moi’ or the ‘citizenries’ of
nation-states as a basis for democratic deliberation and
representation. The democratic legitimacy of international
(e.g., extradition treaties), supranational (e.g., EU-regula-
tion) and transnational regulations (e.g., EPs and other soft-
law MSIs) relies in his opinion on the participation of
national governments, which are able to democratically
consult their de`moi. If Habermas’ account would be taken
seriously, this would imply that the democratic legitimacy
of the EPs would have to be grounded on the scattered
de`moi of many nation-states and the path of the engage-
ment of these de`moi would be paved with several obsta-
cles. On this picture, stakeholders would be indirectly
engaged as participants of the democratic processes of
nation-states and the complexities associated with this
indirect involvement would render the prospects for
democracy in transnational MSIs rather dim (Martens
2014). Moreover, one of the main reasons for establishing
the EPs (and other MSIs) is precisely that the governments
of many nation-states have difficulty taking joint (collab-
orative) action on socio-environmental risks in project
finance (and other sectors), and it seems likely that these
problems would persist when nation-states would play a
central role in MSIs such as the EPs.
Indeed, Mena and Palazzo’s (2012) as well as Hahn and
Weidtmann’s (2016) attempts at applying Habermas’
conception to MSIs try to avoid these problems associated
with the indirect engagement of stakeholders by proposing
legitimacy criteria for the direct engagement of stake-
holders. They thus take distance from the original Haber-
masian approach and try to translate it into the new
political constellation (Mena and Palazzo 2012, 531). In
what follows, we identify two main problems regarding
their proposals:
First, both Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann do not
explicitly address the question as to what would be the
de`mos of an MSI, that is, which stakeholders should be
engaged in MSI-decision-making to realize democratic
legitimacy. They simply assume, without further discus-
sion, that all those addressed and affected by the rules of an
MSI should be included in the discussion and decision-
making (Mena and Palazzo 2012, 537; Hahn and Weidt-
mann 2016, 101). Such a proposal, however, cannot
(easily) be brought in line with the way Habermas analyzes
the boundaries of the de`mos. Habermas’ democracy prin-
ciple (1996, 110) restricts the de`mos to the members of a
political community, which attempts to regulate itself by
means of law. This implies, we argue, that from a Haber-
masian perspective only those addressed by the rules of an
MSI, and not those that are merely affected by it, would
belong to the de`mos.3 This position constitutes an alter-
native to the views held by Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Wei-
dtmann. It may be true that the prospects for democracy are
dim if the de`mos of an MSI is considered to consist of an
amalgam of the de`moi of all relevant nation-states and if
stakeholders are indirectly engaged via national represen-
tative democracy. And, indeed, a potentially successful
response to this may be to conceive of democracy in MSIs
along the lines of the direct democratic engagement of
stakeholders (as Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann pro-
pose). However, following this path requires a systematic
Habermas-inspired answer to the question as to who should
make up the de`mos of an MSI if democratic legitimacy is
obtained through the direct engagement of stakeholders—
an answer which has not yet been given.
Second, the approaches of Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/
Weidtmann make only partial, but not very well explained
use of Habermas’ detailed conception of the institutional-
ization of deliberative democracy that could be useful for
an analysis of the EPA. Habermas (1996) points out that in
modern societies deliberative democracy is institutional-
ized in a constellation of five differentiated but connected
elements, including:
1. Preparation of rule-production in public discussions;
2. Representative decision-making about regulations;
3. Implementation by an administration;
2 Cp. for the distinction between a Westphalian and a post-
Westphalian world order (Conley and Williams 2011, 545; Held
and McGrew 2007; Kobrin 2009; McGrew 1997; Rhodes 1996;
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).
3 This modified Habermasian position seems to be insufficient when
debating the boundaries of the de`mos under the current globalized
conditions (Goodin 2007; Abizadeh 2012), as it excludes important
categories of affected persons and organizations from influencing the
rules which (might) have a considerable impact on them. We resolve
this issue by arguing that Habermas’ general discourse principle
requires the actors and addressees that together make up the demos of
an MSI, to engage the otherwise affected in stakeholder discussions
and consider them in their decision-making.
1118 W. Martens et al.
123
4. Adjudication of norms in factual situations; and
5. Meta-regulation of these four elements in a constitu-
tional framework.
Hahn and Weidtmann (2016) restrict their conception to
the first two elements, that is, public discussion and decision-
making. Mena and Palazzo (2012), on the other hand, indi-
cate that enforcement in the sense of practical implementa-
tion and verification of rules is important. Democracy
apparently demands—besides the influence of the addressed
on decision-making—certain features of rules that make
them enforceable (Mena and Palazzo 2012, 542), as well as
the ability to monitor and sanction their application.
Although Mena and Palazzo find enforcement important,
they focus on monitoring, because they consider substantial
sanctioning difficult to achieve in the context of MSIs (Mena
and Palazzo 2012, 542). We believe, however, that an
analysis of implementation of rules in transnational MSIs
could gain precision by integrating some of Habermas’
insights regarding the importance of administration and
adjudication for the realization of democracy in an analytical
framework for MSIs. We propose to view specification,
monitoring and sanctioning as functions of administration,
and interpretation and sentencing to create security and
justice as functions of a judiciary, and argue that both should
be institutionalized in MSIs, e.g., by the creation of well-
developed independent administrative and adjudicative
bodies. We also point to the contribution of constitutional-
ization for the development of functions necessary for
democracy and learning in MSIs—an element that escapes
the attention of Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann.
Below, we discuss the two challenges we identified—the
demarcation of the de`mos and a more comprehensive use
of Habermas’ conceptualization of the institutionalization
of deliberative democracy—to provide a framework for the
analysis of MSIs such as the EPs. After these elaborations,
we apply this framework to the EPA. In doing so, we not
only show that such an MSI can indeed be said to have a
de`mos rather independently of nation-states, but also that
on this basis the five Habermasian elements of deliberative
democracy can be sensibly conceived in the context of an
MSI and that our framework helps to assess the democratic
qualities of the EPA.
The De`mos of an MSI
The application of a Habermasian approach to the institu-
tionalization of deliberative democracy for the direct
engagement of stakeholders in MSIs requires a solution to
the potential problems that Ma¨kinen and Kourula (2012) as
well as Whelan (2012) identify with regard to the use of
Habermasian ideas. They argue that Habermas’ account
does not offer the conceptual resources for understanding
how MSIs can be democratized independently of the
democratic institutions of nation-states. We agree with
these considerations: Habermas (2009) assumes indeed that
the democratization of transnational regulatory structures,
such as those of MSIs, necessarily depends on de`mos,
representation and enforcement of nation-states and
supranational organizations. If that would be true, there
would be no possibility for understanding democracy in
MSIs as the direct democratic involvement of stakeholders.
However, Habermas does not explore the possibility that
these MSIs could have their own de`moi and that the
institutionalization of a democratically organized engage-
ment of stakeholders that make up these de`moi could lead
to the democratization of these initiatives independently of
nation-states. In case there is a systematic way to identify
the de`mos of an MSI—which is something that Mena/
Palazzo as well as Hahn/Weidtmann assume, but not
elaborate—then it could make sense to assess democracy in
MSIs along the lines of Habermas’ five regulative elements
for the institutionalization of deliberative democracy. To
make Habermas approach available for the assessment of
democracy in the institutionalization of the direct engage-
ment of stakeholders in MSIs, we will therefore argue that
MSIs can be democratized relatively independently of the
de`moi of nation-states and supranational organizations.
To explain which stakeholders make up the de`mos of an
MSI, we argue in the remainder of this section that:
1. A transnational MSI can indeed be seen as a gover-
nance regime with its own de`mos;
2. The authors and addressees of the regulations of an
MSI can be considered its de`mos that should have
democratic rights; and
3. All those that are otherwise affected by the initiative—
and are neither authors nor addressees—should be
engaged following Habermas’ general discourse
principle.
(ad 1) Although the de`mos of a voluntary and self-regu-
latory soft-law MSI is not constituted through citizenship as
in the case of nation-states, such an initiative can (still) be
said to have a de`mos. To understand how this is possible, we
must start by highlighting an important difference between
nation-states and transnational MSIs: The demarcation of the
de`mos of a nation-state implies the existence of a people that
is mainly delimited from other peoples by territorial
boundaries and by their identification with the nation (state).
Nation-states regulate all sorts of issues that are encountered
by citizens who live in the same territory, and for which they
jointly develop, maintain and obey regulations. MSIs, on the
contrary, do not have a territorially delimited ‘people’ and do
not regulate all sorts of issues within the territory (Dryzek
and Niemeyer 2008; Scholte 2002). Rather, they are char-
acterized by participation that transgresses territorial
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boundaries, and the primary reason for their existence is the
establishment of regulation for a specific or limited set of
issues that are not related to a particular national territory
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). For example, the Forest Ste-
wardship Council (FSC) regulates the sustainable production
of wood and timber; the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) regulates the worldwide use
of internet protocols; and the EPA regulates socio-environ-
mental risks in project finance transactions. Stakeholders do
not identify with an MSI because they live in the same ter-
ritory or belong to the same people, but because they have
reasons to recognize the issue(s) that the MSI addresses and
to develop regulation(s) with regard to it or to submit
themselves to them. Stakeholders that jointly lay down
regulations and/or submit themselves to these kinds of reg-
ulations are operating as a collective actor (List and Koenig-
Archibugi 2010; List and Pettit 2011; Saunders 2012) with
the purpose of dealing with certain issues. Those stake-
holders that develop regulations of an MSI and/or are sub-
mitted to them make up the de`mos of a voluntary and self-
regulatory soft-law MSI. Hence, the boundaries of the de`mos
of an MSI are somewhat fluid: Anytime a group or an indi-
vidual chooses to become part of the regulatory regime of an
MSI (or decides to leave it), the MSI-de`mos changes
accordingly.
(ad 2) Yet, soft-law MSIs have more stakeholders than
those that develop the regulations of the initiative and are
addressed by them. With regard to transnational regulation,
a distinction is often made between the actors who develop
the regulations of a regime as rule-makers and standard-
setters, the addressees (of the regulations) to whom the
standards apply, and the otherwise affected who experience
(in-)direct consequences of the application of these regu-
lations (Cafaggi 2011).
On our account, in which we conceptualize the de`mos of
a transnational MSI as a collective actor consisting of those
developing the regulations and submitting themselves to it,
the otherwise affected are not part of the de`mos. An MSI
may have various stakeholders that do not belong to its
de`mos, and from the perspective of collective agency it
would be unwise to just relax the definition of the de`mos in
order to include them. The perspective of collective agency
shows that the possibility of democratic decision-making in
an MSI does not only depend on its democratic procedures;
it also requires that ‘its level of internal diversity does not
prevent successful collective decisions and coordinated
actions’ (List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010, 110). All col-
lective agents need to draw certain boundaries of inclusion
and exclusion (i.e., insiders vs. outsiders) to guarantee for
sufficient ‘internal cohesion’ and to avoid paralyzing
decision-making and the coordination of actions. That is,
they need to draw a line between those that are merely
affected by the regime and those that are subjected to its
regulation and democratically engaged in developing it.
This necessity is also recognized by Habermas, who con-
siders nation-states as collective actors whose members
identify with their community (Habermas 1996, 97f. and
156f.). His democratic principle of legitimacy—which
states that ‘only those statutes may claim legitimacy that
can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive
process of legislation’ (Habermas 1996, 110)—is valid for
legal self-regulation inside national communities. This,
however, does not imply that those that are not addressed,
but only affected by the regulations of an MSI do not merit
consideration—to the contrary.
(ad 3) Following Habermas’ discourse principle, the
legitimacy of the regulations depends, in general, on the
acceptance and involvement of those affected by them. The
principle claims that ‘[j]ust those action norms are valid to
which all possibly affected persons could agree as partic-
ipants in rational discourses’ (Habermas 1996, 107).
Habermas’ normative approach to democracy in legislative
processes cited above is meant as a specification of this
discourse principle for the people that build a self-regu-
lating collective agent. But this does not imply that the
de`mos has no responsibility vis-a`-vis the affected non-
members. In case of a transnational MSI, legitimacy
therefore does not only depend on the democratic
involvement of the stakeholders that belong to the de`mos;
it also depends on the communicative involvement of all
otherwise affected. The discourse principle requires that
stakeholders that make up the de`mos should consider the
regulations they make also as general action norms in so far
as they affect other stakeholders that do not belong to the
de`mos. The legitimacy of democratically produced regu-
lation—that allows the stakeholders of the de`mos to make
decisions and act as a collective agent—demands thus also
the provision of structures for consultation and engagement
of those affected by the initiative (this, of course, not for
the sake of democracy, but for the general legitimacy of
regulations). The otherwise affected are not given the same
democratic rights as the de`mos. This would potentially
destroy the initiative as a collective agent. But they should
have a right to voice their opinion (and receive answers in
the context of the decision-making procedures of the MSI)
and to engage in stakeholder dialogs. Such dialogs allow
for the consideration of their interests and values in MSI-
decision-making, and for the transformation of the interests
and values of all participants.4 This is how an MSI could
4 Our position follows the line of Saunders (2012), List and Koenig-
Archibugi (2010) and Song (2012). In an intense discussion with
(among others) Goodin (2007) and Abizadeh (2012), they plea for a
restriction of the de`mos of a democratic community to those
addressed in the context of collective action, but at the same time
demand that the (otherwise) affected are granted influence in the
discussions and decisions of this community. Goodin and Abizadeh
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consider otherwise affected stakeholders to develop regu-
lations to which all affected ‘could agree as participants in
rational discourses.’
The Institutionalization of Habermasian
Deliberative Democracy in MSIs
Habermas’ (1996) conception of democracy suggests that
in nation-states deliberative democracy is institutionalized
in a constellation of five differentiated, but connected
elements that we briefly summed up above. These institu-
tional elements can realize the democratic engagement of
the members of the de`mos in the development of the reg-
ulations to which they jointly submit themselves. We have
described a way to demarcate the de`mos of an MSI and
thus fulfilled a central precondition for analyzing the
institutionalization of the direct engagement of stakehold-
ers in transnational MSIs along the lines of the five
Habermasian elements of deliberative democracy.
Although these institutional elements have been developed
for national democracies, they can also be used as indica-
tions for the way in which democracy can be institution-
alized in MSIs. This task, however, demands a re-
specification of the five elements for the engagement of the
members of the MSI-demos. Moreover, this re-specifica-
tion should also provide for a conceptualization of the
engagement of otherwise affected stakeholders in dialogs,
and the consideration of their interests and values in
decision-making. We specify these institutional elements
of deliberative democracy in the following paragraphs to
provide a framework for the assessment of the democratic
qualities of transnational MSIs, and of its legitimacy
regarding otherwise affected stakeholders. For each of the
Habermasian elements, we present a brief discussion of its
general meaning, followed by an elaboration of its specific
meaning in the MSI-context based on recent research in the
fields of political philosophy, juridical theory and interna-
tional relations research.
Stakeholder Discussions
The core of deliberative democracy is that the regulations
to which the participants of a political community—the
members of the de`mos—submit themselves should be
based upon public discussion in which those addressed by
the rules can debate their interests and convictions
(Habermas 1996). All addressed, all members of the
de`mos, should be able to participate in discussions. Such
discussions are necessary to find ways to jointly realize
(potentially conflicting) interests and thus develop a rea-
soned public will that can inform representational decision-
making about rules, the administration of these rules as
well as adjudication in cases where interpretation and
conflict resolution are required (Habermas 1996, 97f.).
With regard to ethical-political discussions, Habermas
explains that when, ‘for technical reasons’, not everyone
can take part in an actual discussion, a dialog of repre-
sentatives should be accepted: ‘Discourses conducted by
representatives can meet the condition of equal participa-
tion on the part of all members […] if they remain porous,
sensitive, and receptive to the suggestions, issues and
contributions, information and arguments that flow in’
(Habermas 1996, 182).
Following Habermas’ discourse principle (Habermas
1996, 107) we propose that in the case of MSIs, where
regulations are often highly consequential for otherwise
affected stakeholders that do not belong to the de`mos, these
‘non-members’ should also have access to stakeholder
discussions to establish legitimacy of regulations beyond
the political community of the initiative.
The legitimacy of a transnational MSI is thus, in the first
place, to be found in stakeholder discussions to which all
three categories of stakeholders (i.e., actors, addressees
and otherwise affected) have access—if necessary through
representation, and through which information about the
functioning and outcomes of the regulation and other
affairs relevant to the issue at stake is easily accessible and/
or available to all. These discussions should lead to an
elevation of the discursive level of public opinion forma-
tion (Habermas 1996, 362) via:
(a) The articulation of the diverse meanings, topics,
values and interests of the different categories of
affected and addressed persons and organizations;
(b) The clustering and rationalization of the most
important and influential complexes of meanings,
topics and values into a set of recognizable and
representative discourses; and
(c) The exertion of influence on the attention and
interpretation frames of decision-makers (Dryzek
2013, 344ff.). These ‘inter-subjectively tested’ dis-
courses can become part of the deliberations in
decision-making.
Representative Decision-making
Legitimacy of regulations requires the formal representa-
tion of all addressees in decision-making concerning these
regulations (Habermas 1996, 169f. and 183) as well as the
consideration of the arguments of all otherwise affected
Footnote 4 continued
argue for the possibility of temporary extensions of the de`mos to
allow the occasional inclusion of those affected by regulation. They
admit that it is difficult to organize this practically. Saunders and
Song point out that, besides practical problems, this strategy also has
serious theoretical drawbacks.
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stakeholders by the representatives of the de`mos (Haber-
mas 1996, 107).
In nation-states, democracy implies the representation of
all citizens of the geographically bounded de`mos in a
legislature by giving them all an equal vote in choosing
their representatives. In the case of an MSI, this approach
to representation may be infeasible given that the members
of its de`mos are often dispersed over large areas. In some
cases, it might even include various groups of people that
are only moderately aware of their connection to the MSI
and/or ignorant of the idea of democracy (Scholte 2002).
Moreover, if the boundaries of the de`mos of an MSI are
fluid, and can change easily and at any time a stakeholder
becomes submitted to the regulations of the MSI, then
proportional representation of all actual constituents of the
de`mos may be unpractical and violate the spirit of
democracy. In such cases, a solution consists of replacing
the representation of each individual member of the de`mos
by a representation of the different discourses (i.e., dif-
ferent sets of perspectives, topics, meanings and values that
are persistently articulated by stakeholders in discussions
and that form relatively stable positions in stakeholder
dialogs (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Dryzek 2013)).
Discourses are distinguished on the basis of their con-
tent, and not, as was the case with the stakeholder dis-
cussions that we discussed above, on the basis of who takes
part in them. A discussion among stakeholders in the
context of the EPA may encompass discourses on, for
instance, bank interests, the protection of the environment
and respect for human rights, and these latter discourses
may be further divided into, e.g., labor rights, women rights
and children rights. In such cases, decision-making bodies
should involve persons who are formally responsible for
representation of the distinguished discourses.5
When systematically selected, representatives of dis-
courses can be seen as the representatives of the members
of the de`mos of an MSI that participate in these discourses
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008, 485ff.), and can legitimately
participate in decision-making about the regulations of the
MSI on behalf of the members of the de`mos.6 Above, we
argued that the legitimacy of regulations also requires the
participation of otherwise affected stakeholders in discus-
sions as well as the reasoned consideration of their views
by the representatives of the addressees when making
decisions. This implies that only those discourses that are
brought forward by the addressees must be represented in
decision-making bodies. The discourses that are main-
tained by otherwise affected stakeholders, and the prob-
lems they bring forward, should be placed on the agenda
and accounted for by the representatives of the addressees.7
Administration
The application of regulations that have been made in
representative decision-making requires the separate insti-
tutionalization of an administration. An administration
does not justify regulations, but takes regulations that have
been justified in representative decision-making as a basis,
and ensures that these rules are adequately implemented
(Habermas 1996, 186). Administration is thus at the same
time based upon and limited by democratically developed
regulations. The specification of the practical meaning of
these regulations in concrete guidelines, including clear
rights and obligations, the monitoring of the observance of
these guidelines as well as the sanctioning of disobedience,
are among the main tasks of the administration (Habermas
1996, 134).
Just as in nation-states, the rational understanding that
obeying democratically developed regulations of an MSI is
in the interest of all members of the de`mos is insufficient
for understanding how to comply in practice and for
motivating compliance. An administration with executive
and coercive powers is also needed in MSIs to establish
how to follow the rules, how to monitor rule-obedience and
how to punish non-compliance. The sanctions available to
the administration of an MSI take a different form com-
pared to those of nation-states. Transnational MSIs do not
have a monopoly on the (legitimate) use of force and other
hard law sanctions. Nevertheless, they can and do sanction
stakeholders that violate the respective rules and standards.
For instance, Rugmark, an MSI that aims to abolish child
labor in the carpet industry, punishes the violation of its
norms through public naming and shaming and the (tem-
porary) suspension of certificates (Take 2012, 235). Both
naming and shaming and the suspension of certification can
be powerful (soft-law) sanctions for MSIs. Moreover, MSIs
can call in the help of third parties for monitoring, and they
can, together with nation-states, organize a ‘distribution of
labor’ regarding monitoring and sanctioning of rule-com-
pliance—with MSIs executing the ‘normal monitoring and
sanctioning’ and national administrative bodies taking the
responsibility for ‘hard’ cases of norm violations (Ver-
bruggen 2013).
5 See for other ways of arriving at the representation of discourses
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).
6 Cp. for an illustration the representation mechanism in the rule-
setting body of the Forrest Stewardship Council (FSC) which is
organized in different ‘chambers’ for social, environmental and
economic discourses (with a further distinction between ‘North’ and
‘South’) with equal powers in decision-making (https://ic.fsc.org/
governance.14.htm; Moog et al. 2015).
7 The FSC, for instance, organizes ‘stakeholder consultation’ in the
development of regulations (https://ic.fsc.org/en/certification/open-
public-consultations).
1122 W. Martens et al.
123
Adjudication
Any set of regulations, no matter how democratically
developed and carefully administrated, requires the possi-
bility of a reasoned judgment regarding the adequacy of its
application, and in case of norm violation a verdict and
respective consequences (i.e., sanctions). Judgments
involve interpretations that close the void between rules
and factual situations in which parties appeal or refer to
those rules. The adjudication of rules is a political act in the
sense that it involves not only an understanding of the
articulated will of the de`mos, but also a further articulation
and development of this will. Adjudication involves solv-
ing conflicts between presumed legitimate claims while
simultaneously preserving consistency with the rules and
their applications in earlier cases (Habermas 1996, 234ff.).
It establishes fair decisions for those engaged, but also
enhanced certainty about the meaning of regulations in
specific situations (Habermas 1996, 197). Fair and pre-
dictable adjudication demands procedural standards that
ascertain the public accessibility of judgments, the provi-
sion of reasons for these judgments, due process (i.e.,
hearing the defendant and confronting the evidence), as
well as the possibility of lodging an appeal against a
judgment. In short, it demands the ‘rule of law’ (Waldron
2008). This requires, in particular, independent specialized
bodies for adjudication (Habermas 1996, 237).
The adjudicating functions and procedures that are
indicated above—and that are typical for nation-states—
can nowadays also be found in MSIs. In some MSIs, reg-
ulation is increasingly a matter of rule of law (Thompson
2012; Kingsbury et al. 2005). This could enhance the
fairness of their regulations and the consistency and pre-
dictability in terms of rule-application. The systematization
of dispute settlement could thus also improve the general
level of trust in an MSI and provide fairness and certainty
to its stakeholders.
Constitutionalization
Through a constitution, the members of the de`mos give
themselves a legal-normative description of the main
political aims and structures of their collective. In a
democratic collective, the constitutional documents contain
principles that determine the formation of a self-governing,
collective agent (Habermas 2001, 767f.).
In the case of a transnational MSI that is directed to an
issue such as socio-ecological risk management in project
finance transactions (i.e., the EPs), the basis of the con-
stitution consists of a joint mission statement that delin-
eates the key issue(s) the participants aim to deal with. In
relation to this, the constitution also defines who can be
considered a member of the de`mos. Moreover, it settles the
way in which the stakeholder–addressees can (indirectly)
be the makers of the rules they submit themselves to, and
how the views of the otherwise affected stakeholders
should be dealt with in decision-making. For this purpose,
the constitution provides basic stipulations for the institu-
tionalization of the four regulative elements discussed
above—with regard to stakeholder discourses, representa-
tive decision-making about regulations, adjudication and
implementation. Lastly, it contains rules and procedures
that specify how and under which circumstances the con-
stitution itself can be changed and amended without the
MSI losing its identity (Rosenfeld 2011). Constitutional
reforms—in nation-states as well as within transnational
MSIs—often reflect ongoing learning, implementation
experiences and emerging good business practices. In
general, a constitution as a universal framework document
has a normative status in the sense that it provides the basis
for other rules of the MSI, and these rules can be assessed
and adjudicated with reference to the constitution. The
constitution thus gives guidance for the further develop-
ment and advancement of the other institutional (gover-
nance) elements of an MSI (Habermas 2001, 768).
The Democratic Qualities of the EPA
from a Habermasian Perspective8
In what follows, we assess the democratic qualities of the
EPA by means of the framework we have developed above.
This assessment shows that the specification of Habermas’
conception of deliberative democracy, developed in the
foregoing section, can indeed be applied fruitfully to
transnational regulatory networks. We first describe the
general characteristics of the EPA followed by an analysis
of how and to what extent the EPA’s Governance Rules
institutionalize the engagement of stakeholder groups
through the five Habermasian elements of deliberative
democracy (including an identification of the most impor-
tant stakeholder groups of the EPA).
General Characteristics
The EP-standards for environmental and social risk man-
agement apply globally to the following four financial
market products.
8 Most of the information and data presented in this paper is publicly
available on the official EP-Web site and/or it is based on published
material by academics, NGOs and finance ethics think tanks.
Additional in-depth research—with the main purpose of verifying/fal-
sifying certain information or data—has been conducted with the help
of several semi-informal interviews with EPA-, IFC/World Bank-
and NGO-officials and off-the-record conversations with top-level
(European) EPFI-representatives.
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1. Project finance;
2. Advisory services related to project finance;
3. Project-related corporate loans; and
4. Bridge loans.
The EPs are based on the Performance Standards on
Environmental and Social Sustainability of the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation and the World Bank Group’s
Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines. They are
adopted by so-called Equator banks or EPFIs, that is,
financial institutions which are active in the project finance
sector. The EPFIs commit themselves to not providing
loans and credits to projects where the borrower is not able
or willing to comply with the respective social and envi-
ronmental standards and guidelines. As of today, 89
financial institutions from 37 countries and six continents
have adopted the EPs. According to official data provided
by the EPA, the EPs cover over 70% of international
project finance debt in emerging markets and developing
countries (EPA 2016).
The overall aim of the EPs is the promotion of envi-
ronmental (i.e., protection of project-affected ecosystems)
and social (i.e., respect for human rights) sustainability in
the (project) finance industry (EPA 2013, 20). To reach
these goals, the EPs impose obligations on both lenders
(EPFIs) and borrowers (clients), in particular with regard to
review and categorization (principle 1); environmental and
social impact assessment (principle 2); environmental and
social management systems and action plans (principle 4);
stakeholder engagement (principle 5); grievance mecha-
nism (principle 6); monitoring (principle 9); and reporting
(principles 9 and 10). These obligations get formalized as
covenants (principle 8), which are part of the loan docu-
mentation or investment agreement between the EPFI and
the project developer.
The EPA is the unincorporated association of EPFIs
established in 2010. The association’s objective is the
‘management, administration9 and further development of
the EPs’ (EPA 2016). It is governed by a set of Governance
Rules which specify the internal governance structures as
well as decision-making procedures10 within the EPA. Two
governance levels have to be distinguished: the ‘manage-
ment’ level and the ‘administrative’ level of the secretariat
(Fig. 1).
The management level consists of the Steering Com-
mittee which is responsible for the management and further
advancement of the EPs as well as the coordination of
administrative tasks. EPFIs become members of the
Steering Committee on the basis of a rotation principle for
a maximum of three years. Among the members of the
Steering Committee, one EPFI gets elected as chair of the
Steering Committee. The chair functions as the speaker and
provides coordination.
The Steering Committee can set up permanent or tem-
porary working groups fostering the inclusion of stake-
holder groups. One of the main tasks of these working
groups is to discuss governance and implementation issues
and to provide guidance to EPFIs with regard to the further
advancement of the EPs. Currently, nine working groups
exist, including the ones on capacity building and training,
consistency, external relations (i.e., communication with
external stakeholders such as NGOs and civil society
organizations), biodiversity, climate change, social risk and
regional outreach.
The second level of the EPA is the so-called adminis-
tration level consisting of the EP-Secretariat. The Secre-
tariat manages the everyday running of the EPA. In
particular, the Secretariat is responsible for the EP-Web
site, internal and external communications, public rela-
tions, advice and assistance with regard to adopting and
implementing the EPs and the management of financial
affairs.
Stakeholder Groups
By means of our previous definitions, we explain which
groups belong to the de`mos of the EPA, that is, which
groups are actors in the establishment of the EPs and which
groups are addressed by them. We also indicate which
groups are ‘otherwise affected’, and should therefore be
engaged in stakeholder discussions, and influence EPA-
decision-making.
The main stakeholders of the EPs include (a) the
‘Equator banks’ or EPFIs; (b) the EPFIs’ clients, that is,
project developers and operators; (c) civil society organi-
zations and NGOs; and (d) project-affected communities,
such as indigenous peoples. Below we explain whether
they belong to the group of actors, addressees or otherwise
affected stakeholders.
1. The actors group comprises all stakeholders that are
formally engaged in articulating, reviewing and updat-
ing the EPs and the rules and procedures of the EPA.
This group contains the ‘Equator banks’ that are
officially engaged in maintaining and adjusting the EP-
framework.
9 The term ‘administration’ refers here to the official language used
by the EPA. It should not be confused with the Habermasian
terminology as explained below.
10 EPA-decision-making aims at consensus-seeking. Each EPFI has
one vote; proposals are typically adopted when at least 50% of all
EPFIs cast votes—so-called quorum of half—and when 66.7% of
them vote in favor of a particular proposal (EPA 2010/2013, 13ff.).
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2. The addressees group contains all those financial
institutions that are required to implement the EPs into
their socio-environmental risk management and due
diligence frameworks, namely the EPFIs. Furthermore,
it contains all the EPFIs’ clients, that is, project
developers and operators. They are expected to fulfill
the requirements laid down in the EPs. These obliga-
tions are imposed by the lender upon the borrower, and
they get formalized as covenants. The EPs thus
regulate the business conduct of EPFIs as well as the
business conduct of their clients. The actors and
addressees together form the de`mos. Hence, the
boundaries of the EPA-de`mos are somewhat fluid:
Every time a new bank enters the EPA and becomes an
EPFI, and every time a client decides to obtain
financial means from an ‘Equator bank’ and thus
submits itself to the EPs, the de`mos of the EPA
changes, respectively.
3. The group of all otherwise affected stakeholders
consists of civil society organizations and NGOs as
well as project-affected local communities: Neither the
EPs nor the Governance Rules of the EPA apply to
them directly; therefore, they do not belong to the
de`mos of the EPA. These groups are nevertheless
indirectly affected by the application of the EPs and in
particular by the industrial and infrastructure projects
that are financed under the EPs (e.g., coal, oil and gas
projects; (mountaintop removal) mining projects;
bridges, dams and power plants projects).
Although these communities and organizations are not
part of the actual de`mos, they should be engaged
following Habermas’ general discourse principle. That
is, they should have access to stakeholder discussions
and their interests and values should be considered in
decision-making to obtain general legitimacy of the
regulations established by the actors and addressees
(Saunders 2012).
Stakeholder Discussions
At present, four main stakeholder discussions can be dis-
tinguished—two formal and two informal ones: The two
formally organized discussions take place within the EPA
and its working groups (cp. paragraphs 1 and 2 below),
while the two informal discussions take place within the
Thun Group of Banks, and other subgroups of (non-)EPFIs
(3), and among finance NGOs, such as BankTrack, and the
general public (4). In what follows, we describe for each of
the discussions, first, the various types of (stakeholder)
communication surrounding the EPs. In a second step, we
critically analyze and evaluate them from a Habermasian
perspective—based on the criteria of accessibility of the
discussions for all stakeholders (which is a precondition for
the articulation and clustering of meanings, topics, values
and interests in typical discourses that can influence deci-
sion-making) and availability of relevant information to all
(which is a precondition for meaningful discussions as
such).
(ad 1) Discussions surrounding the official EPA-review
and update process: The last review and update process
took place between 2010 and 2013. It consisted of an
internal consultation phase that yielded a first draft of EP
III, a second phase that gave all other stakeholder groups
the chance to comment on the initial draft and to make
suggestions for further improvement, and a last phase in
which the third generation of the EPs was finalized and
launched The invitation to comment on the proposed
revision of the EPs, in the second phase of the update
process, provoked various responses from stakeholders
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between NGOs, EPFIs and the EPA). These interactions in
the context of the review process are a good example of a
discussion among stakeholders from within and beyond the
de`mos of the EPA. They can contribute to the transfor-
mation of interests and values and help to find ways to
inform representative decision-making and thus jointly set
and realize the goals of the EPA. The problem from a
deliberative democracy perspective is that the EPFIs do not
engage with NGOs and other stakeholders on a regular
(formal) basis, e.g., within a stakeholder forum or advisory
group being part of the EPA, but only incidentally.
(ad 2) Discussions within the working groups of the
EPA: Many of the discussions about the purposes, content
and functioning of the EPs take place within the working
groups. Although these working groups cover the majority
of the issues and discourses that may be important to other
stakeholder groups of the EPs, they are solely accessible
for bank representatives. Only the ‘Biodiversity for Bank’s
(B4B) program, that was co-launched together with the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Business and Bio-
diversity Offsets Program (BBOP),11 contains (a basic
form of) stakeholder engagement and makes use of civil
society input and expertise. It is this severely limited access
of other stakeholders to the working groups that hinders the
development of stakeholder discussions that could form the
basis for representational decision-making, administration
and adjudication within the EPA.
Both formally organized discussions described above
suffer from a lack of publicly disclosed information about
the actual functioning of the EPA and the on-the-ground
outcomes of the EPs. For many interested stakeholders, it is
almost impossible to find out what has been discussed
within the EPA in general and the Steering Committee in
particular. The public disclosure of information and public
consultation are often prevented by confidentiality duties
toward the association and/or the EPFIs’ clients (Richard-
son 2005; Mikadze 2012; BankTrack 2011; Wright 2012).
Both intransparency and the lack of information hinder the
establishment of meaningful stakeholder dialogs.
(ad 3) Discussion within the Thun Group of Banks: The
so-called Thun Group of Banks consists of seven leading
international banks, six ‘Equator banks’ (Barclays, BBVA,
Credit Suisse, ING Bank, RBS Group and UniCredit) and
one non-EPFI (UBS). In 2013, the Thun Group of Banks
published a draft paper on banks and human rights (Thun
Group of Banks 2013). The paper provides a first guide to
the banking sector for operationalizing the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie 2013;
United Nations 2011).
During the drafting process itself, apparently no mean-
ingful consultation and engagement took place with
affected stakeholder groups such as NGOs, civil society
organizations and human rights activists (BankTrack 2013,
2). This implies that the initial discussions within the Thun
Group of Banks were insufficiently accessible for many
stakeholder groups. As a consequence, the paper has been
criticized for its poor stakeholder engagement (BankTrack
2013; de Felice 2015).
Interestingly, however, the exclusive discussions within
the Thun Group of Banks provoked much broader and, in a
sense, more fruitful discussions among financial institu-
tions, practitioners and academics. Especially, the discus-
sions on human rights due diligence might initiate and
stimulate the next EPA-review and update process. If
developed further (in particular with regard to the trans-
parency and availability of information), these could be
made open to all and could therefore provide a basis for
representative decision-making, administration and
adjudication.
(ad 4) Discussions initiated by NGOs and civil society
organizations: Besides functioning as watchdogs, NGOs
(and other civil society organizations) contribute to the EP-
discussions among practitioners and academics by pub-
lishing case studies and project-related data on their Web
sites (including data documenting the respective environ-
mental, social and human rights violations associated with
the different projects financed under the EPs). These
reports help in assessing single companies (both financiers
and project developers/operators), whole industry sectors
and/or individual (controversial) projects. BankTrack and
other finance NGOs have also released documents that
propose reform measures that could help to prevent ‘dodgy
deals’ and to strengthen the EP-framework. These docu-
ments point out institutional shortcomings as well as
potential ways in how to overcome them (BankTrack
2011, 2012; Lazarus and Feldbaum 2011; Lazarus 2015).
In short, finance NGOs are able to sensitize key actors in
the project finance industry (and beyond); they help to raise
awareness for crucial socio-environmental and human
rights issues; and they are able to put pressure on the main
stakeholders (i.e., EPFIs and EPA) to take further action
toward the full realization of the EPs’ potential. The
activities of NGOs thus constitute a stakeholder discussion
in itself, but also initiate further dialogs among banks, civil
society and researchers. These dialogs are in principle open
to all, provide relevant information to the public, put major
banks under reputational pressure, and challenge the
organizational legitimacy of the EPA and their member
institutions. If the EPA would institutionalize mechanisms
to systematically consider these discussions in the devel-
opment of the EPs, this would represent a move toward
(more) deliberative democracy.
11 BBOP is an international cooperation between corporations,
finance institutions, government agencies and civil society organiza-
tions (http://bbop.forest-trends.org/).
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The analysis so far has shown that several stakeholder
discussions take place inside and outside of the EPA. The
formally organized discussions suffer from a lack of
accessibility and limited availability of information. This
diminishes the legitimacy of the EPs. Nevertheless, these
somewhat underdeveloped formal stakeholder discussions
have spurred various informal, open stakeholder discus-
sions involving public information about a variety of issues
and discourses that have emerged within civil society.
These informal discussions could build the basis for rep-
resentative decision-making, administration and
adjudication.
Representative Decision-Making
At present, formal decision-making within the EPA is a
matter of EPFIs only. The participating banks are the only
(stakeholder) group that is officially engaged in maintain-
ing and adjusting the EP-framework (recall that only banks
can become member of the EPA’s Steering Committee and
the respective working groups). Democracy, however,
demands that (the representatives of) all stakeholder groups
addressed by the respective rules (in this case, the EPA’s
Governance Rules) should be involved in associational
decision-making—at least with regard to the respective
discourses. This is clearly not (yet) the case, since project
developers and operators are excluded from associational
decision-making procedures.
Besides, the Governance Rules concerning the Steering
Committee and the working groups give no systematic,
institutionalized voice to (the discourses of) otherwise
affected stakeholder groups. This, however, is demanded to
establish the general legitimacy of network regulation.
The limitations of representation in formal decision-
making are understandable against the background of the
characteristics of the de`mos of the EPA: All EPFIs’ clients
belong to the de`mos, but they are dispersed all over the
world. In addition, they are not necessarily aware of the
affairs of the EPA and they may not be familiar with
democratic decision-making. Moreover, the boundaries of
the de`mos are rather fluid since its composition changes
each time an EPFI acquires a new client or loses one. A
problem that complicates the systematic consideration of
the views of otherwise affected stakeholders in decision-
making is the high number of very diverse local commu-
nities that are (potentially) affected by the EP-framework,
as well as the many NGOs and civil society organizations
that bring forward numerous socio-environmental interests.
These circumstances suggest that representative deci-
sion-making may be better served by a representation of
discourses, rather than by a (proportional) representation of
stakeholders. Indeed, various discourses can be distin-
guished within the stakeholder discussions that we
identified above. For instance, there are discourses related
to banks and human rights (e.g., with regard to human
rights due diligence and covenants); climate change (e.g.,
whether banks should divest from fossil fuel industries and
coal, oil and gas companies); (FPIC-based) stakeholder
dialog and engagement (in particular with regard to
indigenous communities); or the extension of the (regional)
scope of the EP-framework (e.g., ‘going beyond project
finance’ and/or whether an outreach strategy toward the
emerging markets is required to level the playing field).
These discourses could serve as a basis for the represen-
tation of the addressees of the EPs and for the systematic
consideration of the view of otherwise affected stake-
holders in decision-making.
Administration
From a Habermasian perspective, the administration of an
MSI has three major roles to fulfill: (1) concretizing and
specifying the rules for implementation; (2) monitoring
(non)compliance; and (3) sanctioning rule-infringement.
(ad 1) Providing concrete guidelines for the implemen-
tation of MSI-regulations: The EP-Secretariat, currently
consisting of two members of staff, is responsible—among
other things—for giving advice and assistance with regard
to adopting and implementing the EPs. The EP-imple-
mentation note ‘… contains selected information and
examples to support the understanding of the requirements
in, and implementation of, the Equator Principles…’ (EPA
2014, title page). Both the EPA’s Governance Rules and
the EP-disclaimer state however that ‘… the Equator
Principles do not create any rights in, or liability to, any
person, public or private’ (EPA 2013, 11). This implies that
the EPFIs can adopt and implement the EPs at their own
discretion. Therefore, at present the EPA is to be consid-
ered a rather informal organization mainly based on indi-
vidualized (voluntary and self-regulatory) rule-
specification.
(ad 2) Monitoring (non-)compliance: In reality, the EPs
suffer from inadequate monitoring mechanisms. For
instance, up to today, EP-compliance relies mainly on
passive (non-EPA) monitoring (Sarro 2012 1542ff.): Civil
society organizations and NGOs function as informal
monitoring institutions and watchdogs (O’Sullivan and
O’Dwyer 2009). In case of apparent non-compliance, they
might start advocacy campaigns and/or protest movements
and customer boycotts. This form of civil society criticism
often causes public outcry and thus exposes non-compli-
ance to the EPA, its members and other stakeholders. Yet,
so far there is (almost) no proactive engagement in terms of
monitoring; a credible independent and transparent form of
monitoring and control is (mainly) lacking.
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(ad 3) Sanctioning non-compliance: The self-regulatory
EP-regime lacks a credible deterrent, since effective
sanctions for rule-violations are lacking. The question
therefore comes up whether the EPs have enough ‘legal
bite’ to penalize participants that fall behind their voluntary
socio-environmental commitments? Currently, the EPFIs
face only little sanctions from the side of the EPA should
they not comply with the EPs. A (temporary) delisting is
possible according to the EPA’s Governance Rules, if
‘Equator banks’ fail to report publicly or if they fail to pay
the annual membership fee. Only in these cases will
‘Equator banks’ be excluded from EPA-membership. A re-
adoption, however, is still possible. The regulations of the
EPA do not entail the possibility to delist a company
because of non-compliance and/or violation of the EPs
(EPA 2010/2013, 26). So far only public naming and
shaming campaigns initiated by NGO–watchdogs might
put EPFIs and their clients under (reputational) pressure.
Yet this ex-post way of sanctioning cannot be steered and/
or applied by the EPA for rule-enforcement. It is thus
insufficient to prevent non-compliance and practical fail-
ure, e.g., in the form of financing ‘dodgy deals’.
In summary, we can conclude that the EP-framework
suffers from a lack of adequate administrative mechanisms.
A major underlying problem relates to the EPA being
understaffed and underfunded: The budget remains low
compared to other MSIs and covers only the costs for the
secretariat, the Web site and annual meetings. Moreover,
the management structure of the EPA is rather loose and
‘handled by EPFIs, who, in addition to their other
responsibilities within their financial institutions, volunteer
their time as EP-chair, Steering Committee members and
leaders and members of Working Groups’ (Lazarus 2015,
134). So, while the autonomy and independency of the
functions of specification, monitoring and sanctioning is
central to democracy in the EPA, these functions are—out
of necessity—executed by the EPFIs in a more or less
arbitrary way.
Adjudication
The EPs in their current version suffer from a lack of
implementation, due to the absence of an independent
adjudicating body. Such a body is all the more important
considering the existence of various governance gaps and
ambiguities within the EP-framework: The EPs and the
EPA’s Governance Rules are vaguely and sometimes even
ambiguously formulated leaving discretionary leeway for
diverging interpretations and exit door strategies. The
language used is often declaratory rather than compulsory
and imperative; some principles are conditional in nature
and/or contain mere recommendations. As a consequence,
both borrowers and lenders are able to circumvent the
contractual obligations of the EPs (Marco 2011, 470).
Banks, for example, can redefine their project finance
activities as representing something else, such as corporate
or export finance. Project financiers can classify their
projects as category B or C to avoid a stricter A-classifi-
cation (Haack et al. 2010, 21; Wright 2012, 68). Last but
not least, financial institutions can provide loans in dif-
ferent tranches to not meet the respective financial
thresholds of the EPs.12
Especially under this condition of serious ambiguity, an
independent adjudicating body is essential for arriving at
interpretations of regulations that are fair (with regard to
the engaged stakeholders), consistent (with the overall
rules) and predictable (given earlier adjudications). Inter-
pretations are now made by the EPFIs themselves without a
further systematic consideration of other stakeholders. This
implies that the act of solving potential conflicts between
legitimate claims of stakeholders while maintaining the
consistency of the regulations lies solely in the hands of
some of the EPFIs without much guarantees for indepen-
dent adjudication. In the absence of a developed adminis-
tration and independent adjudicating body, the
specification and interpretation of the EPs and other regu-
lations of the EPA remains arbitrary, and disconnected
from the values and expectations of the other members of
the de`mos as well as the otherwise affected stakeholders.
Constitutionalization
The constitutionalization of the EP-framework and the
EPA can be found in the EPs themselves as well as in the
EPA’s Governance Rules. Both documents provide
descriptive and normative stipulations with regard to (1)
the main aims and key issues of the association; (2) the
core members of the association and its other (external)
stakeholders; (3) the participation of the respective stake-
holders in discussion and decision-making; and (4) the
organization of implementation and rule-enforcement.
(ad 1) The main aims of the EP-framework, formulated
in the principles, include the identification, assessment and
management of environmental and social risks and impacts
in project finance. In doing so, the EPs seek to promote
‘sustainable environmental and social performance’ and
‘improved financial, environmental and social outcomes.’
They also acknowledge ‘the importance of climate change,
biodiversity, and human rights, and believe negative
impacts on project-affected ecosystems, communities, and
the climate should be avoided where possible. If these
impacts are unavoidable they should be minimized, miti-
gated, and/or offset’ (all: EPA 2013, 2; cp. EPA 2010/
12 Cp. for further loopholes and gray areas the EP-implementation
note (EPA 2014); see also EPA (2010/2013, 15ff., 2014, 22).
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2013, 4). These aims and issues clearly state which values
and goals should be considered important and thus give the
EPA a framework for the evaluation and improvement of
existing institutional provisions, in case they appear to be
insufficient for their realization.
(ad 2) The definition of the de`mos of the EPA is part of
the official statement of the EPs and includes all EPFIs;
that is, all those financial institutions that are active in
project finance, project finance advisory services and pro-
ject-related corporate loans (and bridge loans) (EPA 2010/
2013, 1). Every financial institution that is active in the
project finance industry and that wants to commit itself to
the EP-framework can become a member of the EPA and
can thus be represented in associational decision-making.
To remain a member, EPFIs need to report on an at least
annual basis and pay the annual membership fee. Further
(minimum) entry criteria that have to be met prior to
becoming a member of the EPA do not exist. On the basis
of our conceptualization, the de`mos of the MSI should be
made up of all those addressed by the regulations that have
been drawn up for a collective purpose. In the EP-frame-
work, the EPFIs recognize merely their own role as
financiers with ample ‘opportunities to promote responsible
environmental stewardship and socially responsible
development, including fulfilling [the] responsibility to
respect human rights’ (EPA 2013, 2). However, they
neglect the equally important role of the financed projects
in promoting these goals as well as the fact that (most of)
the regulations of the EPA apply to the EPFIs’ clients,
which make them an essential part of the de`mos. The
present EPA-definition narrows down the de`mos of the EPs
too much by excluding project developers and operators
from the EP-de`mos.
(ad 3) EPA-membership is restricted to project finance
banks. Consequently, they are the only members repre-
sented in the associational decision-making bodies. This
implies the exclusion of other groups of addressed stake-
holders, that is, the project developers and operators.
Moreover, the consideration of otherwise affected stake-
holders is insufficiently embedded in the constitutional
documents of the EPA. Neither the EPs nor the EPA’s
Governance Rules stipulate how these stakeholders could
be represented or considered in associational decision-
making. Seen from the perspective of legitimate self-reg-
ulation and given the established goals and values of the
association, the ‘EP-constitution’ is too restrictive in its
articulation of representative decision-making.
(ad 4) So far, there are no basic rules and/or organiza-
tional mechanisms defined in the constitutional documents
of the EPA that state how the EPA should deal with
adjudication, monitoring and sanctioning.
In sum, we can conclude that the main issues the EPs
aim to address are officially established in the
constitutional documents of the EPA and that a relatively
precise, yet (too) narrow definition of the de`mos is
explicitly formulated there. Moreover, the currently exist-
ing arrangements for decision-making are laid down in the
EPA’s constitutional documents. However, the current
arrangements exclude several groups of addressed stake-
holders from representation, and all affected stakeholders
from consideration in decision-making. The other regula-
tive elements of deliberative democracy (administration
and adjudication) are largely absent in the EPA, and this
is—unfortunately—also reflected in its constitutional
documents.
From our perspective of deliberative democracy, the
present constitutionalization is nevertheless an important
element of democracy for the EPA as it facilitates insti-
tutional learning processes. Even a constitution that is
insufficiently developed from this perspective can serve as
a starting point for reflection and improvement if the stated
aims are (a) considered in relation to the ideal of deliber-
ative democracy and (b) compared to the present arrange-
ments (or lack thereof) for the demarcation of the demos as
well as for stakeholder dialogs, decision-making, admin-
istration and adjudication.
Reform Proposals
Below, we summarize some reform proposals that directly
follow from the deliberative democracy framework pro-
posed in the section ‘A Habermasian Account of Deliber-
ative Democracy in MSIs’ that would enhance the
legitimacy of the EPA. These measures consist of sug-
gestions for a wider demarcation of the de`mos (that would
also include the EPFIs’ clients), the institutionalization of
consideration of otherwise affected stakeholders in asso-
ciational decision-making, and the further elaboration on
and institutionalization of administration, adjudication and
constitutionalization.13
1. Stakeholder discussions should be open to all, and
relevant information should be available to all partic-
ipants. This could be achieved by opening up the
formal discussion among EPFIs for other stakeholders
(e.g., NGOs, civil society organizations and project-
13 This includes new regulative arrangements as well as the further
development of the organization of the EPs. The current lack of
professional expertise and limited available resources, in particular,
needs to be overcome: Higher dedicated resources and more
professional staff are especially required when dealing with issues
such as the development of an effective audit system for EP-reporting,
the formulation of EP-adoption and entry criteria, the revision and
update of the Governance Rules and the implementation of outreach
activities in developing countries and emerging markets (cp. for more
information on the proposed structural reform of the EPA, including
enhanced funding and staffing and a professionalization of the
association: Lazarus and Feldbaum 2011; Lazarus 2015, 134).
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affected communities) and by providing the necessary
information to all interested stakeholders. Moreover, a
change from incidental stakeholder consultations that
can spur discussions—such as in the EP-revision and
update processes—to a continuous and ongoing dialog
related to human rights and environmental, social and
governance issues seems necessary.
2. Provided that stakeholder discussions are working
properly, the institutionalization of the representation
of discourses in decision-making would provide a
solution for the representation of EPFIs and their
clients. That is, the discourses of project developers
and operators (the constituents of the de`mos) should be
represented in associational decision-making. This
form of discourse representation a` la Dryzek could be
achieved by changing the decision-making rules of the
EPA that presently give voice/vote only to EPFIs. The
consideration of (all) otherwise affected stakeholders
in decision-making could be organized by means of
(more or less) continuous consultation of representa-
tives of the discourses that otherwise affected stake-
holders maintain within the stakeholder discussions.
Consultation of the discourses of stakeholders such as
environmental, social and finance NGOs and local
communities could be achieved via an EP-stakeholder
forum as suggested by the reform commission of the
EPA.
3. Administration requires the institutionalization of the
three functions of specification, adequate monitoring
and (automatic) sanctioning (including delisting of
non-compliant EPFIs and the public announcement of
delisting decisions made by the EPA). They all
demand the further development of the secretariat as
well as changes in various EP-regulations.14
4. To harden the governance structures of the EP-
framework, the interpretation of the EPs (and other
EPA-rules) in cases of conflict should not be left to the
stakeholders engaged in a specific project. Of partic-
ular importance is the establishment of an independent
adjudicating body through an associational conflict-
resolution mechanism which might help with these
issues (i.e., ‘soft case law’).
5. The above reform proposals for the institutionalization
of deliberative democracy should be constitutionalized
through an update of the EPs as well as the EPA’s
Governance Rules. This could (further) facilitate future
discussions about EP-modifications.
Concluding Remarks
Habermas’ approach to deliberative democracy is often
taken as a starting point for evaluating the political
responsibilities of (multinational) corporations when they
take on (self-)regulatory roles as rule-makers and standard-
setters (Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2008, 2011). Ma¨kinen
and Kourula (2012) and Whelan (2012), however, have
raised the concern that Habermas’ approach is too much
based on ‘nation-state democracy’ to be directly applicable
in the context of transnational MSIs. In response to this, we
have argued that an application of Habermas’ concept of
deliberative democracy to MSIs may be worthwhile, but
only after a theoretical modification thoroughly addressing
Ma¨kinen and Kourula’s (2012) and Whelan’s (2012)
concerns.
We have elaborated our theoretical modification in two
steps: First, to resolve the issue of Habermas’ (alleged)
‘nation-state orientation’ and to realize an important pre-
condition for conceptualizing the institutionalization of
direct democracy in MSIs along Habermasian lines, we
have argued that MSIs have a de`mos independently of the
de`moi of nation-states. The diverse stakeholders that
jointly create an MSI cooperate as a collective to develop
and apply regulations to deal with a perceived problem and
to submit themselves to these regulations. From the nor-
mative perspective of democracy, those that develop the
regulations of an MSI and/or are addressed by it make up
its de`mos and should all be involved in democratic self-
regulation. This delimitation of the demos of an MSI in no
way implies the complete exclusion of non-addressed
affected stakeholders. Following Habermas’ general dis-
course principle, the values and interests of otherwise
affected stakeholders should be respected in decision-
making to obtain general legitimacy of the regulations; yet,
this is not a matter of democracy per se. Second, we have
identified the five general institutional elements of delib-
erative democracy that can be found in Habermas’ work,
that is, public discussions, representative decision-making,
administration, adjudication and constitutionalization,
which can guide the realization of democracy of pluralist
collective actors. We have also explained how these five
general elements can be re-specified for the context of
transnational MSIs. Both theoretical problems have not yet
been addressed in the literature on MSIs (Mena and
Palazzo 2012; Hahn and Weidtmann 2016).
These elaborations yield several more specific theoretical
contributions to the academic literature on democracy and
MSIs. Our framework differs from currently existing ones in
five major aspects of ‘deliberative democracy for MSIs’:
First, we demonstrate that the de`mos of an MSI deserves
explicit attention and can be meaningfully distinguished (from
14 In the academic literature, there is a debate going on whether MSIs
like the EPs should implement a credible deterrent in the form of an
enforcement pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Sarro 2012).
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the perspective of collective agency) as those making or being
addressed by the regulations of the MSI. Second, we have
argued on this basis that only the addressed should be demo-
cratically involved in decision-making. The otherwise affec-
ted stakeholders, which do not belong to the de`mos, should
nevertheless be involved in stakeholder discussions and their
values and interests should be taken into account in decision-
making within the MSI. Their involvement and consideration
should be regulated explicitly in the MSI. We thus provide
guidelines and arguments for the identification and inclusion
(or exclusion) of MSI-stakeholders as well as for the differ-
entiation of roles of addressed respectively affected stake-
holders in the MSI-governance processes.Third, we show that
Habermas’ conception has more to offer with regard to the
institutionalization of deliberative democracy than has been
uncovered so far in articles that apply it to MSIs. Habermas’
five general functions should be realized to democratize
governance in MSIs. Their specific realization in MSIs is,
however, substantially different from their realization in
nation-states and therefore demands explicit discussion. A
comparison of our specifications for MSIs with the concep-
tualizations of Mena/Palazzo and Hahn/Weidtmann reveals
that especially the functions of stakeholder discussions,
administration, adjudication and constitutionalization are
elements that are novel to the discussion, and enhance
democracy when differentiated and regulated in transnational
MSIs. Fourth, our approach stresses the interdependencies
among the various elements of deliberative democracy: Not
only representative decision-making, but also administration,
adjudication and constitutionalization should contribute to
democracy and legitimacy of regulation by MSIs. Finally, we
emphasize the institutional learning and development oppor-
tunities that follow from constitutionalization.
The application of our conceptualization of Haber-
masian deliberative democracy to the EP-framework
illustrates that Habermas’ five regulative elements of
deliberative democracy can indeed be used for assessments
of transnational MSIs. It clarifies that the EPA is still far
from being a democratic MSI and helps to identify insti-
tutional changes that could contribute to democratizing the
EPA. Some of these institutional changes—such as the
involvement of stakeholders in decision-making and the
necessity to monitor rule-application—can also be identi-
fied by means of the existing frameworks of Mena/Palazzo
and Hahn/Weidtmann. However, our approach also iden-
tifies institutional changes that would remain invisible from
these perspectives. These concern (a) the differentiation of
addressed and otherwise affected stakeholders of the EPA
and the different ways of ensuring a legitimate engagement
of these stakeholders, (b) the representation of the dis-
courses within stakeholder discussions regarding the EPA
instead of its stakeholders, (c) the development of an EPA-
administration in which specification, monitoring and
sanctioning are integrated, (d) the independent adjudica-
tion of the EPs and related regulations, and (e) an update of
the normative self-descriptions that are formulated in
constitutional documents of the EPA. Strengthening, in the
sense of democratizing, the EPA could be achieved via the
gradual and long-term institutionalization of deliberative
democracy for MSIs, along the lines of the proposals
above. MSIs such as the EPA can thus help to fill regula-
tory vacuums, while also helping to overcome democratic
deficits in transnational regulations independently of
nation-states.
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